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Abstract
 
Mirror neurons are increasingly recognized as a crucial substrate for many developmental processes, including imitation and
social learning. Although there has been considerable progress in describing their function and localization in the primate and
adult human brain, we still know little about their ontogeny. The idea that mirror neurons result from Hebbian learning while
the child observes/hears his/her own actions has received remarkable empirical support in recent years. Here we add a new element
to this proposal, by suggesting that the infant’s perceptual-motor system is optimized to provide the brain with the correct input
for Hebbian learning, thus facilitating the association between the perception of actions and their corresponding motor programs.
We review evidence that infants (1) have a marked visual preference for hands, (2) show cyclic movement patterns with a fre-
quency that could be in the optimal range for enhanced Hebbian learning, and (3) show synchronized theta EEG (also known
to favour synaptic Hebbian learning) in mirror cortical areas during self-observation of grasping. These conditions, taken
together, would allow mirror neurons for manual actions to develop quickly and reliably through experiential canalization. Our
hypothesis provides a plausible pathway for the emergence of mirror neurons that integrates learning with genetic pre-programming,
suggesting new avenues for research on the link between synaptic processes and behaviour in ontogeny.
 
Introduction
 
Human development would be unthinkable without the
capacity to learn by observing others’ behaviour. ‘Mirror
neurons’, first described in the premotor cortex of macaque
monkeys (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti, 1996;
Keysers, Kohler, Umiltà, Nanetti, Fogassi & Gallese,
2003; Kohler, Keysers, Umiltà, Fogassi, Gallese &
Rizzolatti, 2002) have the property of responding both while
the individual executes an action and while he/she sees
or hears another individual performing a similar action.
This suggests that these neurons are part of a circuit that
translates the actions of  other individuals into the
language of the observer’s own actions, enabling the
observer empathically to understand the actions of others
while at the same time learning to perform a similar action
(e.g. Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006;
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Clearly, mirror neurons
are not the only way in which a viewer can process actions:
general visual processing mechanisms can enable humans
to view and understand movements that are not within their
action repertoire. When an action is, however, within the
motor repertoire of  an observer because he/she has
performed very similar actions or at least actions with a
similar goal (Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker & Keysers, 2007a;
Gazzola, van der Worp, Mulder, Wicker, Rizzolatti &
Keysers, 2007b), mirror neurons could enrich perception
of the action considerably, by linking it with the wealth of
privileged knowledge deriving from having performed it.
Such privileged knowledge includes the motor program
used to perform the action (in particular the way the
action unfolds in time), allowing the observer to predict
future movements (Umiltà 
 
et al
 
., 2001) and potentially
replicate the action, and also the somatosensory feelings
(Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh & Keysers, 2006; Gazzola 
 
et al.
 
,
2007a, 2007b; Keysers 
 
et al.
 
, 2004) and the emotions
associated with that action (for example in the case of
facial expressions: Jabbi, Swart & Keysers, 2007; Wicker
Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 2003).
There has been considerable progress in describing the
location and function of the mirror neuron system (MNS)
in the primate and human brain (Buccino, Binkofski &
Riggio, 2004; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti, 1996;
Gazzola 
 
et al.
 
, 2006; Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga & Rizzolatti,
1996; Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino,
Mazziotta & Rizzolatti, 2005; Keysers 
 
et al.
 
, 2003;
Keysers & Gazzola, 2006; Kohler 
 
et al
 
., 2002; Rizzolatti
& Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese & Fogassi,
1996; Umiltà 
 
et al
 
., 2001). If mirror neurons are important
for the social development of children, understanding
how mirror neurons themselves develop is an important
question for developmental psychology and neuroscience.
However, we still know surprisingly little about their
ontogeny (Lepage & Théoret, 2007; Kilner & Blakemore,
2007; but see also Shimada & Hiraki, 2006). Are mirror
neurons (MNs) the result of learning processes, or do they
acquire their function by genetic pre-wiring? Proponents
of the former (Arbib, 2004; Brass & Heyes, 2005; Keysers
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& Perrett, 2004) maintain that, given the existing anatom-
ical connections between temporal, parietal and premotor
areas, some neurons will acquire ‘mirror’ properties
following a simple neural learning phenomenon: Hebbian
synaptic potentiation, sometimes paraphrased as ‘what
fires together wires together’, can link motor neurons
involved in producing an action with visual/auditory
neurons responding to the sight/sound of the action itself.
A remarkable body of recent evidence seems to support
this learning-based account (see below).
Many researchers, however, remain skeptical (Bertenthal
& Longo, 2007; Hurford, 2004; Meltzoff, 2005; Meltzoff
& Decety, 2003; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi & Gallese,
2002), or explicitly favour explanations involving some
amount of genetic predisposition at the neuron level (Lepage
& Théoret, 2007; Piattelli-Palmarini & Bever, 2005).
From the evolutionary point of view, it is indeed reasonable
to expect that an ability as crucial for survival as action
recognition and learning through observation would become
pre-programmed (‘innate’) to some degree during phylo-
genetic history; however, the critical issue of 
 
how
 
 MNs
could be pre-programmed to perform their task is rather
unclear. Thus, the controversy remains unresolved, and
our understanding of MNS ontogeny is still partial and
unsatisfactory. Here we propose that Hebbian learning
and genetic pre-programming can be integrated in a
broader perspective, by suggesting that the MNS might
initially develop through 
 
experiential canalization
 
 (Gottlieb,
1991a) of 
 
Hebbian learning
 
 (Keysers & Perrett, 2004). We
argue that this hypothesis, while admittedly speculative,
has three distinct advantages: it goes beyond simple
nature–nurture dichotomies and is consistent with
current evolutionary biology; it helps to make sense of
some otherwise puzzling developmental phenomena;
and it suggests interesting new questions for empirical
research. The paper is organized as follows: we will
begin by describing the concept of canalization and the
Hebbian learning hypothesis; then we will present
our ontogenetic model; and finally we will review the
empirical evidence in support of our position.
 
Experiential canalization
 
Imagine a young bird that has to recognize what birds of
its own species sound like in order to follow its mother’s
calls. How can natural selection accomplish this crucial
task? In the simplest innatist account, the bird’s brain
could be hardwired during foetal development to recognize
the sound of birds of the same species. This would ensure
a quick response (no learning time is required) and
robustness against spurious associations; however, the
process would require precise stimulus matching, sub-
stantial genetic specification, and could end up being
very sensitive to minor perturbations of neuronal wiring
(owing to genetic or developmental factors). In the
simplest learning account, the bird could simply associate
what it hears and sees until it develops an appropriate
representation of its mother’s sound. This would allow
for greater flexibility; however, there may be prices to
pay, in terms of slowness resulting from trial-and-error
learning and susceptibility to spurious associations (for
example, the bird hears calls of another species). Although
some ontogenetic processes might have been selected to
unfold in such narrowly specified ways, there is another
possibility, one that allows for both robustness and
flexibility: development guided by 
 
experiential canalization
 
.
Canalization, first conceptualized by Waddington (1942)
and Schmalhausen (1949), means that a developmental
process is buffered against perturbations: canalization
ensures that important features of the organism emerge
reliably, resulting in invariant species-typical development,
despite great variation between individuals in environ-
mental conditions and genotypic makeup (see Flatt, 2005;
Niven, 2004). Development results from interactions
between genes and environment, and, crucially, both genes
 
and
 
 environment can act as sources of invariance and
stability; canalization is the result of predictable interactions
between genetic mechanisms and reliable features of the
environment (West-Eberhard, 2003). Often, the organism’s
sensory experience plays an essential role in directing
ontogeny, leading to experiential canalization (Gottlieb,
1991a). A classic example is the development of ducklings’
preference for species-specific auditory features of maternal
calls. Ducklings raised in incubators, without previous
experience of maternal stimulation, nevertheless sponta-
neously exhibit the ‘correct’ preference for their own
species’ maternal calls. This might prompt some to attribute
such preference to some form of pre-wiring in the auditory
brain system, with some innate encoding of  species-
typical acoustic patterns. However, the key factor appears
to be the early exposure to 
 
self-produced vocalizations
 
,
which themselves contain the correct acoustic features: if
ducklings are experimentally prevented from hearing
their own vocalizations, they subsequently fail to exhibit
selective responses to maternal calls (Gottlieb, 1991b).
Far from denying the importance of genetic effects,
experiential canalization emphasizes the need to dissect
the epigenetic pathway to find out 
 
how
 
 genes, environment
and experience interact to shape development. In this
particular case, genetic factors indirectly influence brain
development in at least three ways: (1) by affecting the
anatomy and physiology of the duckling’s vocal apparatus;
(2) by affecting the duckling’s tendency to produce early
vocalizations; and (3) by predisposing its auditory system
to learn from vocalizations, just at the right time.
 
The Hebbian mirror system
 
The idea of Hebbian learning in the mirror system has been
proposed to show that the MNS 
 
could 
 
develop without
the need for genetic pre-wiring (Keysers & Perrett, 2004),
without necessarily denying the possibility of genetic
predetermination. In a nutshell, this model makes three
assumptions: (1) anatomical connections exist between
the temporal, parietal and premotor areas involved in
the mature mirror system; (2) these connections are
 352 Marco Del Giudice 
 
et al.
 
© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
 
implemented by Hebbian synapses; and (3) the infant
watches and listens to himself perform actions (Figure 1).
Activity in a certain population of premotor neurons
causes the infant to perform a particular action (for
example precision grasp). The infant views and hears
himself  perform this action, and activates populations of
neurons in the temporal cortex that respond preferentially
to this action. This sensory signal reaches the original
premotor population of neurons that caused the action
 
and
 
 other neurons responsible for different actions. In
the case of the premotor neurons responsible for the
action execution, the synaptic input reaches neurons that
are active, and this synchrony leads to Hebbian potentiation.
In the case of the neurons responsible for different actions,
the synaptic input will reach inactive neurons, leading to
Hebbian depression of the synapses.
After repeated execution–self-observation loops, the
statistical properties of pre- and post-synaptic activity
will prune the incongruent perception–action connections
and potentiate the congruent ones. If  the infant now sees
and/or hears another individual perform similar actions,
the vision and/or sound of these actions activates the
population of neurons in the temporal lobe that also
respond to his own actions and, through the potentiated
congruent synapses, activates premotor neurons that
now have acquired mirror properties (see Keysers &
Perrett, 2004, for a more detailed exposition).
 
1
 
 Hebbian
learning could explain the development of MNs not only
in infancy: experimental evidence suggests that adults
can develop MNs for novel skills, and Hebbian learning
could explain how they do so. For instance, adults who
have never played the piano fail to activate their pre-
motor cortex to the sound of piano; after five one-hour
piano lessons, however, they do, suggesting that the
repeated association between the sound and the action
of pressing a key has created a Hebbian association
between auditory neurons and premotor MNs (Lahal,
Saltzman & Schlaug, 2007; see also Catmur, Walsh &
Heyes, 2007).
The hypothesis that Hebbian learning is involved in
the ontogeny of MNs is also part of the 
 
Associative
Sequence Learning
 
 theory of imitation (Brass & Heyes,
2005; Heyes, 2001). This theory, which links explicitly
imitative behaviours to the activity of the MNS (Brass &
Heyes, 2005), assumes that imitation is experience-
dependent (for similar proposals, see also Greenwald,
1970; Piaget, 1962; Prinz, 1997, 2002), and that repeated
observation of self-produced movements is necessary to
link visual and sensory-motor representations of actions.
Although still not conclusively proven, a growing
number of findings support such a ‘learning’ account of
MNS development. Recognition of intentional grasping
in human infants is poor until about 5 months, and
improves significantly between 6 and 9 months (Király,
Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben & Gergely, 2003; Wood-
ward, 1998, 1999, 2003, 2005; Woodward, Somerville &
Guajardo, 2001). This timeline overlaps substantially
with that of motor development of infant grasping:
directed grasping begins at about 3 months, then differ-
entiates in subclasses (for example precision grip, whole-
hand prension), developing rapidly in the 3–5 month
window (Bethier & Keen, 2006; Dimitrijecic & Bjelako-
vic, 2004; Paillard, 1990; Thelen 
 
et al
 
., 1993; Thelen &
Corbetta, 2002; Wallace & Whishaw, 2003; White, Castle
& Held, 1964; Wimmers, Savelsbergh, Beek & Hopkins,
1998). Recent evidence shows that grasping recognition
and execution are directly linked in early infancy. First,
they follow similar developmental paths, with parallel
improvements in the two abilities (Somerville & Wood-
ward, in press; Woodward, 2005). A study with 8-
month-old infants (Reid, Belsky & Johnson, 2005) found
that individual differences in grasping recognition and
execution are strongly correlated: infants who are better
at performing grasping movements are also better at
discriminating anatomically possible versus impossible
grasping videos. Similar correlations were observed in
more complex goal-directed hand actions, for example
pulling a cloth to reach a toy (Somerville & Woodward,
2005) and putting a ball into a box (Falk-Ytters, Grede-
bäck & von Hofsten, 2006). Finally, an experimental
study of pre-grasping infants (Somerville, Woodward &
Needham, 2005) went beyond correlations by showing
that grasping execution has 
 
causal
 
 effects on recognition:
3-month-old infants who underwent a grasping training
before an action–observation session perceived grasping
 
1
 
 Mirror activity has been shown to occur in relation not only to visual
stimuli but also to auditory ones (e.g. Gazzola 
 
et al
 
., 2006; Keysers
 
et al
 
., 2003). Thus, congenitally blind infants are also expected to develop
a MNS, albeit primarily based on the sound of different actions rather
than on vision and sound combined.
Figure 1 Hebbian learning in the brain. Activity in the 
premotor cortex leads to grasping movement. The movement 
is seen by the acting individual, causing activity in neurons in 
the temporal cortex. This activity is sent to the parietal and 
premotor cortex, where it finds neurons that are active because 
the subject is currently performing the action. This leads to 
Hebbian enhancement of the congruent connections from 
temporal to parietal and from parietal to premotor neurons 
representing the same action; incongruent connections do not 
undergo such enhancement.
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actions as goal-directed significantly more often than
did controls. The reverse was not true, however: repeated
observation of other-produced grasping did not facilitate
infants’ grasping execution. Taken together, these results
are consistent with the idea that grasping execution and
recognition are coupled and causally related, as would
be expected if  repeated self-observation was needed for
developing a MNS and successfully recognizing other
individuals’ grasping. An interesting topic for future
research would be to investigate whether infants who cannot
perceive themselves grasping objects (for example infants
born with motor problems, such as brachial plexus injuries)
undergo a delay in their ability to recognize grasping
actions as goal-directed.
Further support for the learning account comes from
the field of artificial intelligence, where neural network
simulations have repeatedly shown that mirror properties
can emerge from recurrent inputs, both in the visual
(Metta, Sandini, Natale, Craighero & Fadiga, 2006;
Oztop & Arbib, 2002; Oztop, Bradley & Arbib, 2004)
and in the auditory (Westermann & Miranda, 2003)
domain. Other (indirect) support comes from evidence
of MNS plasticity in the adult brain in the acquisition
of new motor skills (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes,
Passingham & Haggard, 2005; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes,
Glaser, Passingham & Haggard, 2006; Catmur 
 
et al
 
.,
2007; Cross, Hamilton & Grafton, 2006; Haslinger 
 
et al
 
.,
2005; Lahav 
 
et al
 
., 2007).
 
Developmental canalization of the Hebbian mirror 
system
 
Combining the concept of experiential canalization with
that of Hebbian learning raises the intriguing possibility
that evolution may not have taken the direct route of
pre-wiring neurons with perceptual preference for a
particular action with premotor neurons coding for the
same action. Actually, this form of predisposition implies
the possession of innate representations of others’ actions,
which may pose a formidable obstacle given the complexity
of human (and primate) manipulative ability. Instead,
natural selection could have obtained the same result
indirectly, by adjusting the parameters of infant behaviour
so as to provide optimized conditions for Hebbian training
of visuomotor neural associations, which would result in
canalized development of the MNS, at least for some
basic actions such as hitting, pushing and grasping. Here
we will concentrate on hand actions, but towards the end
of the paper we will show how experiential canalization
of a different nature could help to explain how a mirror
system can develop for facial expressions. For hand actions,
we propose that evolved mechanisms: (1) selectively bias
infants towards observation of their own actions; and (2)
optimize the parameters of self-produced motor patterns
so as to maximize correct Hebbian learning at the synaptic
level. This interplay of perceptual and motor features
would make for highly canalized development of the MNS,
even without genetic pre-wiring of the neurons themselves
(Figure 2). Action recognition is a sophisticated form of
species-typical perception; experiential canalization increases
the efficiency of trial-and-error processes, resulting in
fast and reliable learning of crucial sensory patterns.
Much in the same way as ducklings self-produce the
auditory stimuli that will allow them to recognize their
mother’s calls, human infants self-produce the visuomotor
stimuli that will allow them to attribute immediate
meaning to others’ actions in the world. Of  course,
visuomotor learning is not exclusively (or even primarily)
targeted at MNS development, but is needed for
performing the actions themselves; in fact, we do not think
that it is possible to separate the emergence of mirror
properties in the visuomotor system from the process of
learning to grasp, hit, push and so on (see Figure 2). The
canalization of Hebbian learning that we propose to
facilitate development of the MNS would therefore be
stabilized by evolutionary pressures to develop a well-
coordinated visuomotor system.
Although it is of course difficult to devise a straight-
forward test of this evolutionary/developmental hypothesis,
we can examine if infants actively look at their own actions,
and if their self-produced motor patterns seem to provide
for optimized synaptic learning. We will use grasping as
Figure 2 The development of mirror neurons for grasping in 
our ontogenetic model. Infants’ motor and perceptual 
characteristics lead to canalized Hebbian learning via 
observation of self-produced actions. Visual preference for 
hands, together with a preference for perfect action–perception 
contingency, directs infants’ attention towards salient stimuli. 
Cyclic patterns of spontaneous movement provide optimal 
timing for stabilizing long-term potentiation (LTP) at the 
synaptic level; EEG synchronization at theta frequency (linked 
to attention) further enhances Hebbian learning, probably by 
coordinating neuronal firing in the proper time window.
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our core example, because it is well studied from the
physiological and developmental point of view. We will
show that infants indeed selectively attend to their own
actions early in infancy, and then (only gradually) shift
their focus of attention to the hands of others. We will
then try to identify what behavioural and neurophysio-
logical parameters would be optimal to promote efficient
Hebbian learning, and finally argue that the regularities
of infants’ self-produced motor patterns could have evolved
to match those optimal parameters.
 
An ontogenetic model of the Hebbian 
mirror system
 
Infants’ visual preferences
 
Infants’ early preference for looking at faces is well
known (e.g. Fantz, 1963; Johnson & Morton, 1991;
Macchi Cassia, Turati & Simion, 2004; Turati, Macchi
Cassia, Simion & Leo, 2006). It is less well known that
infants have a marked visual preference for 
 
hands
 
 as
well. Research findings show that hands are extremely
salient stimuli, starting from the first days of life: in what
is still the most thorough observational study of infants’
reaching, White, Castle & Held (1964) showed that 2–3
month olds spend most of their waking time looking at
their own hands. More recently, a notable set of experiments
proved this process to be purposeful and intentional:
newborns actively try to control arm movements in order
to keep their hands visible, even if  effort is required, and
they also move their hands significantly more when they
can watch them, showing a clear preference for hands in
motion (van der Meer, 1997; van der Meer, van der Weel
& Lee, 1995; von Hofsten, 2004). Infants’ visual attention
is also captured by their own reaching and grasping
attempts; as early as 2 months, they begin to perform so-
called 
 
alternating glances
 
 (i.e. the infant raises a hand
near a reachable object, then starts looking back and
forth between hand and object; White 
 
et al.
 
, 1964).
Infants’ preference for hands becomes especially relevant
to our model when coupled with their selective attention
towards 
 
contingent
 
 stimuli. The ability to detect spatial
and temporal contingency is present shortly after birth
(Lemelin, Tarabulsy & Provost, 2002; Tarabulsy, Tessier
& Kappas, 1996). Until 3 months of age, infants show a
preference for perfectly contingent events; that is, for
events whose sensory timing perfectly matches the infant’s
proprioceptive sensation (Gergely & Watson, 1999).
Apart from experimental settings, perfect contingencies
usually arise from self-produced actions; this preference
is thus likely to orient younger infants towards self-
exploration. At about 3–4 months a developmental shift
occurs, with infants showing preference for spatially and
temporally non-contingent movements, which usually
are not self-produced (Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Rochat,
1998; Rochat & Striano, 2000; Schmuckler, 1996; Schmuckler
& Fairhall, 2001). This shift in preference has two
consequences. First, it directs the infant’s attention to
actions that his developing brain does not yet fully
predict. Second, it focuses the infant’s attention on the
hand-actions of other people, potentially promoting learning
by observation. Indeed, after the first semester, visual
preference for an adult’s hands can overcome even that
for an adult’s face, particularly when the hands are
moving and manipulating objects (Amano & Kezuka,
1994; Amano, Kezuka & Yamamoto, 2004). In summary,
research on early visuomotor development suggests that,
until 3 months, infants are particularly attracted by self-
produced movements, especially by their reaching and
grasping attempts. These perceptual preferences ensure
that infants have access to a large amount of input for
Hebbian learning in the MNS.
 
What are the optimal conditions for Hebbian learning?
 
Unfortunately, most neuroscience research on the process
of synaptic long-term potentiation (LTP), which is
thought to underpin Hebbian learning at the neuron
level, has focused exclusively on the millisecond timescale
(Bi & Poo, 2001; Berninger & Bi, 2002; Bi & Rubin,
2005; Dan & Poo, 2006). As a result, we know relatively
little about the ‘macro-temporal’ conditions for Hebbian
learning (i.e. in the second-to-minute scale) that can be
optimized in actual behaviour. Three factors nevertheless
appear particularly important in promoting and sustaining
LTP: (1) cyclic stimulus presentation; (2) optimally spaced
repetition of stimuli (i.e. optimal periodicity); and (3) EEG
synchronization at theta/gamma frequencies. In vivo, a
single episode of synchronized pre- and post-synaptic
activity leads to an LTP that fades quickly. Repeating
the episode after a certain interval can prevent this
spontaneous LTP reversal. In the 
 
Xenopus
 
 frog’s retina,
long-term effects of LTP are maximized if trains of stimuli
are applied every 5 minutes, whereas LTP consolidation
approaches zero for intervals longer than 10 minutes,
with a quadratic relationship existing between time
interval and stabilization (Zhou & Poo, 2004; Zhou, Tao
& Poo, 2003; see Figure 3b). In addition, local EEG
rhythms at theta (3.5–7 Hz) and gamma (30–70 Hz)
frequencies also facilitate Hebbian learning, possibly via
synchronization of neuronal firing in the LTP time window
(Griffin, Asaka, Darling & Berry, 2004; Kahana, Seelig
& Madsen, 2001; Miltner, Braun, Arnold, Witte & Taub,
1999; Paulsen & Sejnowsky, 2000; Seager, Johnson,
Chabot, Asaka & Berry, 2002).
 
The cyclic organization of infant motor patterns: 
optimized for Hebbian learning?
 
Spontaneous motor activity in foetuses and infants is
indeed cyclic. Activity and rest phases alternate with an
average low-frequency period of about 2 minutes (0.5
cycles/min) (Robertson, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990,
1993a, 1993b; Robertson, Bacher & Huntington, 2001;
Robertson & Dieker, 1986, 2003; Robertson, Dierker,
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Sorokin & Rosen, 1982). In addition, spontaneous movements
embed irregular fluctuations, seemingly characterized by
non-random chaotic dynamics (Robertson, 1993a, 1993b;
Robertson 
 
et al.
 
, 2001). Spontaneous motor activity
usually involves the entire body (Almli, Ball & Wheeler,
2001; Groome 
 
et al.
 
, 1999), including arms and hands,
which are often moved repeatedly in short bouts of
activity (Adolph & Berger, 2005; Piaget, 1962). Cyclic
movements (CM) with similar characteristics have also
been reported in rat and sheep foetuses (MacLennan,
Smotherman & Robertson, 1998; Robertson & Bacher,
1995; Robertson 
 
et al.
 
, 1996; Smotherman, Robinson &
Figure 3 A simple mathematical model of synaptic long-term potentiation (LTP) following cyclic learning. (a) Typical spectral 
plot showing cyclicity in infant movements (CM). The cycle’s base frequency λ is about .5 cycles/min (cycle duration: 2 min), and 
irregularity is represented by the standard deviation ε (assuming normal distribution around λ). (b) Quadratic LTP stabilization 
function modelled on the empirical data reported by Zhou et al. (2003). Dotted line: stabilization after one cycle. Solid line: 
stabilization after two cycles. ΔLTP is the increase in stabilized potentiation after one cycle of duration t. Blue circles show the 
average LTP levels measured by Zhou et al. (2003) after two learning cycles. (c) Contour plot of simulation results with p set to 
.5, showing the relationship between cycle period (λ), cycle irregularity (ε) and performance in LTP stabilization. Lighter colours 
represent a higher average increase in stabilization over 30,000 simulated cycles (note: values are rescaled so that 100 corresponds 
to the local maximum). The pattern to be learned (i.e. a specific movement, such as precision grasping) occurs every cycle with 
probability p = .5. The optimal frequency λ increases for increasing values of ε and for decreasing values of p (see text). Superimposed 
symbols show the average values of λ and ε in published studies of human foetuses (squares) and newborns/infants (circles); 
each symbol corresponds to one study. See Appendix for details and references.
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Robertson, 1988; Suzue & Shinoda, 1999), probably
representing an ubiquitous feature of mammalian motor
development.
 
2
 
 In humans, they persist after birth until at
least 4–5 months of age (Groome 
 
et al.
 
, 1999; Robertson,
1987, 1990, 1993a). Remarkably, some kinetic features of
spontaneous movements tend to be stable from foetuses
to 5-month-old infants, despite changes in physical
parameters such as arm weight and length (von Hofsten
& Rönnqvist,1993). The function of  CM remains con-
troversial, and various hypotheses have been put forth.
CM could be functional to foetal neuromuscular and
motor development in early phases, and may later help
to regulate an infant’s interaction with his/her physical
and social environment by alternating phases of activity
and externally directed attention (Bacher & Robertson,
2001; Robertson, 1985, 1987, 1989; Robertson 
 
et al.
 
, 2001).
In the context of our hypothesis, a key function of
CM (and, especially, of their persistence in the first 4–5
months of  human life) may be the optimization of
Hebbian learning in the brain via enhancement of LTP
consolidation. As described above, optimally spaced
learning cycles seem effective in preventing LTP reversal,
with the data available so far suggesting an optimal
frequency of  about .2 cycles/min. Of  course, the dis-
crepancy between the ‘synaptic optimum’ of .2 cycles/
min and the behavioural rhythm of about .5 cycles/min
may depend on fundamental differences in the neural cells
of 
 
Xenopus
 
 frogs versus those of mammals and humans,
or simply on our hypothesis being wrong. However,
other less obvious possibilities exist. First, CM cycles are
quite irregular (see above), whereas the stimuli employed
in the 
 
Xenopus
 
 experiments were extremely regular.
Second, foetuses and infants do not repeat exactly the
same movements from cycle to cycle, leading to effectively
longer inter-stimulus intervals; in other words, the
probability of performing a given movement pattern (i.e.
of presenting the synapse with the ‘correct’ input) during
a given movement cycle is less than one. Both of these
factors, absent from laboratory experiments on LTP but
affecting infants in ecological conditions, can push the
actual optimal frequency higher than would be expected
on the basis of synaptic properties alone.
To explore the impact of these factors, we developed
a simple mathematical model of cyclic Hebbian learning,
based on the LTP consolidation function measured by
Zhou 
 
et al.
 
 (2003). By computer simulations (see Appendix
for details) we obtained the expected value of  LTP
consolidation as a function of  three parameters: the
 
frequency
 
 (
 
λ
 
) and 
 
irregularity
 
 (
 
ε
 
) of CM and the 
 
probability
 
(
 
p
 
) of performing the movement pattern in a given cycle
(behavioural variability). Our aim was to explore whether
the optimal base frequency varied depending on irregularity
and variability, and to investigate the strength of these
effects (Figure 3).
Pattern repetition probability (
 
p
 
) obviously affects the
model’s behaviour: when 
 
p
 
 is set to 1, the optimal frequency
 
λ
 
 is .2 cycles/min (the synaptic optimum). As 
 
p
 
 decreases,
however, the optimal 
 
λ
 
 increases; in the absence of
irregularity, the optimal frequency is just 
 
λ
 
* 
 
=
 
 .2/
 
p
 
, and
for 
 
p
 
 
 
=
 
 .4, it is 
 
λ
 
* 
 
=
 
 .5. Although at present no data exist
on the probability of motor pattern repetition in foetuses
and infants, it seems reasonable to suggest that it should
lie in an intermediate range, especially if  the infant’s
motor repertoire is still relatively small. Although this is
clearly an open empirical question, our model shows
that a behavioural cycle of 
 
∼
 
.5 cycles/min can be consistent
with a synaptic optimum of .2 cycles/min, provided that
infants do not always repeat the same actions from cycle
to cycle. In Figure 3(c), we show the model’s output
when 
 
p
 
 is set to .5. The degree of irregularity (
 
ε
 
) also
affects the optimal base frequency: with increasing 
 
ε
 
, the
optimal 
 
λ
 
 increases, although the effect of 
 
ε
 
 is less dramatic
than that of 
 
p
 
 (and might depend on the exact shape of
CM frequency peaks; see Appendix for discussion). As
can be seen in Figure 3(c), the empirical data from new-
borns and infants seem consistent with this prediction,
whereas those from foetuses do not appear to follow the
same pattern. As mentioned above, irregularity is a
robust feature of CM, and is likely to have some intrinsic
benefits of its own (for example preventing habituation
or generating novel motor patterns), which have not
been taken into account in our simplified model. Such
irregularity is expected to result in a CM frequency
higher than the synaptic optimum.
 
EEG synchronization during grasping
 
EEG activation during infants’ spontaneous activity is
poorly investigated, but infants aged 2–11 months, when
reaching and handling objects, show increased theta
synchronization (especially in the 4.0–5.8 Hz band) in
the parietal and frontal lobes, which are critical for the
mirror system (Futagi, Ishihara, Tsuda, Suzuki & Goto,
1998). Frontal theta rhythms (especially 4.4–5.6 Hz),
declining from 8 to 11 months, were also observed in the
anticipatory phase of  a peekaboo game (Orekhova,
Stroganova & Posikera, 1999; Stroganova, Orekhova &
Posikera, 1998), which requires the prediction of another
individual’s behaviour, and could thus be linked to mirror
activation. Theta rhythms are often studied focusing on
their causes (for example attention, movement control) but,
because they affect synaptic learning, their 
 
consequences
 
on neural processes should be considered as well.
EEG patterns may also increase our understanding of
the development of the MNS by allowing us to indirectly
quantify the activity of the infants’ mirror systems using
mu-suppression. At rest, the premotor/motor cortex appears
to generate synchronized activity in the mu-band (8–13,
15–25 Hz); if  a subject engages in motor activity,
 
2
 
 Interestingly, a frequency of 
 
∼
 
.5 cycles/min was also observed in the
spontaneous firing of retinal ganglion cells in ferret foetuses (Shatz,
1996); such endogenous firing patterns are required in mammals for
proper neural connection before birth. The widespread time invariance
of self-generated rhythms in early development (see Corner, van Pelt,
Wolters, Baker & Nuytinck, 2002 for an extensive review) might indeed
reveal a deep connection with learning processes at the synaptic level.
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this mu-rhythm is suppressed. Interestingly, the same
mu-rhythm is also suppressed when the actions of other
individuals are being observed (Oberman, McCleery,
Ramachandran & Pineda, 2007; Pineda, 2005). Following
this principle, the MNS for grasping seems fully developed
at 40 months of age (Lepage & Théoret, 2006). Measure-
ments in the age range from 0 to 8 months would be
critical to investigate the early development of the mirror
system, but changes in the frequency of EEG rhythms
throughout the first months of life (Marshall, Bar-Haim
& Fox, 2002) render these experiments difficult.
 
Future research directions
 
In this section, we describe some empirical tests that
could be used to assess the validity of our hypothesis. We
also highlight the implications of our proposal for future
research: looking at early neural development as an
experientially canalized process requires the collection of
new types of evidence, both on the structure of early
behaviour and on the properties of the neural networks
involved.
 
Properties of infant cyclic movements
 
We hypothesized that the frequency of spontaneous CM
might be close to optimal for enhanced Hebbian
learning at the synaptic level. Our simple mathematical
model shows that the optimal cyclicity of behaviour need
not be equal to the synaptic optimum; in particular,
both variability in spontaneously produced movements
(which we modelled by pattern repetition probability)
and cycle irregularity tend to favour higher cycle fre-
quencies. This model could now be tested by new studies
of infant CM, by assessing behaviour variability together
with cycle frequency and irregularity.
Some features of our model may also help to shed
light on the nature of individual differences in spontaneous
motor activity. CM frequency shows a fair amount of
inter-individual variation, which led Robertson (1989)
to suggest that the exact frequency of  CM may not be
critical to their function. However, our model predicts
that the optimal frequency for a given individual should
depend on other parameters, such as cycle irregularity
and behavioural variability. If  the model were correct,
individual differences in CM frequency may relate to
one or more of the following: (1) individual differences
in behavioural variability; (2) individual differences in
cycle irregularity; or even (3) differences on the synaptic
side (i.e. in the time function of  LTP consolidation).
Variation in the LTP consolidation function could be a
result, for example, of  the relative density of  NR2A
versus NR2B glutamate NMDA receptors, which has
been found to change during development (see Paulsen
& Sejnowski, 2000; Quinlan, Philpot, Huganir & Bear,
1999). The model also predicts that infants showing less
than optimal combinations of CM parameters should,
all else being equal, exhibit some delay in the acquisition
of action recognition and MNS functionality, which could
be measured for instance using mu-suppression paradigms.
 
Macrotemporal conditions for Hebbian learning
 
We think that much could be gained by investigating the
macrotemporal (i.e. minutes to hours) conditions of LTP
consolidation. On one side, macrotemporal timescales
can be linked more readily to actual behaviour; on the
other, following the fate of LTP over longer time intervals
will help in gaining an understanding of the complexity
of its regulatory mechanisms. We also need data on dif-
ferent species, at various developmental stages; although
Zhou 
 
et al.
 
’s (2003) data are immensely valuable, it is
quite possible that results from developing 
 
Xenopus
 
 do
not generalize to other species. It is also possible that
they do (as we provisionally assumed here), which would
be an important result in itself. At the moment, our
ignorance of how the details of LTP vary in different
organisms prevents the development of more formal
models of  the Hebbian processes involved in early
learning, and limits the generalizability of research findings
in this area.
 
Ontogenetic shifts in preference for contingency
 
We argued that the preference for perfect contingency in
early infancy may be functional to the reliable acquisi-
tion of Hebbian association in the developing brain.
This leads to a novel prediction: ontogenetically, the
shift from perfect to imperfect contingency preference
should 
 
follow
 
 the acquisition of basic MNS functional-
ity. Empirically, longitudinal studies over the first 9
months of life could relate individual differences in the
timing of shifts in contingency preference to individual
differences in the development of action recognition. It
may also be that contingency preferences for different kinds
of actions (for example hand actions versus facial expressions)
shift at different rates, following intra-individual differences
in the acquisition of Hebbian associations.
 
Facial expressions
 
Self-observation is a clear source of Hebbian learning
for actions we can directly perceive. Interestingly, it is
also the case that the sight of some facial expressions
activates the premotor cortex, which is involved in
producing similar expressions (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau,
Mazziotta & Lenzi, 2003; Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti &
Fogassi, 2003; van der Gaag, Minderaa & Keysers,
2007), and the anterior insula, which is involved in
experiencing the correspondent emotions (Jabbi 
 
et al
 
.,
2007; Wicker et al., 2003), thus suggesting the existence
of  a mirror system for emotions (Gallese, Keysers &
Rizzolatti, 2004; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Keysers &
Gazzola, 2006). But how can the brain learn that a
particular facial expression corresponds to a particular
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motor program and emotional state? The concept of
self-observation is unlikely to explain this phenomenon,
because we do not usually see our own facial expressions.
The finding that neonates imitate certain facial displays
(Meltzoff & Borton, 1979; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) has
led to the idea that a mirror system for facial expressions
might be inborn, but this interpretation has been criticized,
because very few actions (for example tongue protrusion)
seem to be reliably imitated (Anisfeld, 1991, 1996, 2001).
Recently, an alternative proposal was advanced that
maintained that the social world holds up a biological
mirror to infants’ facial expressions (Heyes, 2001;
Keysers & Gazzola, 2006; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). The
emotional expressions of the baby often induce adults
around him/her to produce similar expressions, which in
turn provide the infant with a visual input that matches
his motor output and enables Hebbian learning. The
concept of experiential canalization might be essential in
two ways for this account. First, the tendency of adults
to imitate and exaggerate the facial expressions of the
baby could be seen as an adaptation that ensures that
the baby receives the correct input for Hebbian learning.
Second, the infant’s attraction for sensory input contingent
with his/her motor output (Lemelin et al., 2002; Tarabulsy
et al., 1996) could be seen as an adaptation that directs
his/her attention towards facial expression that are
reactions to his/her own. Together, these two factors could
canalize the Hebbian association between the vision and
experience of emotions.
Future research could test this hypothesis by examining
quantitatively whether parents do systematically imitate
the facial expressions of  their children, and whether
differences in such imitation result in differences in the
children’s mirror system for facial expressions at a later
stage in development. A testable prediction of this account
is that the structure of a co-occurrence matrix between a
child’s and parent’s facial expressions should affect the
structure of the facial mirror system. That is to say that
if  a child’s smile is systematically co-occurring with an
adult’s smile, but a child’s distress equally with a parent’s
anger and distress, one would expect activity in the mirror
system and measures of facial mimicry and emotional
contagion to associate happiness with happiness but
distress with both anger and distress. Another line of
evidence could come from the study of the activity of the
MNS for facial expression in infants with fewer opportunities
to see their parents imitate them (for example, non-blind
infants with blind parents). If the social mirror hypothesis
were correct, we could expect that infants whose parents
do not consistently imitate their facial expressions
would show weaker responses in their own motor system
to the sight of facial expressions with respect to normal
infants.
Finally, further empirical research would be needed to
address the question of how neonatal imitation of facial
gestures such as tongue protrusion (which start decreasing
after the second month of life, virtually disappearing around
the fifth month; Abravanel & Sigafoos, 1984; Bower,
1976; Fontaine, 1984; Maratos, 1982) relates to the more
mature forms of facial imitation observed in children from
the end of their first year of life (Myowa-Yamakoshi, 2001).
Myowa-Yamakoshi, Tomonaga, Tanaka & Matsuzawa
(2004) argue that chimpanzees’ early imitation (dis-
appearing after week nine) can be considered an inborn
ability, whereas the sporadic imitation found in juvenile
and adult primates could rely on quite different mecha-
nisms. Could a similar dissociation exist in humans? Do
human neonatal imitations rely on the same mechanisms
as mature, experienced-based imitations? Answering these
questions would help to provide an understanding of
whether neonatal imitation can be considered an inborn
component of a mature MNS, or a distinct mechanism.
Studies investigating the neural network underpinning
imitation in newborns and older children could help to
address this issue. Either way, the existence of neonatal
imitation is fully compatible with our model: we do not
claim that the MNS is either fully inborn or fully acquired,
but that the brain is equipped with mechanisms that
facilitate the acquisition of  novel visuomotor associa-
tions. Indeed, neonatal imitation could facilitate Hebbian
learning by increasing parents’ perception of contingency
with the infant, thus encouraging parental imitation of
the child’s facial expressions, which, in turn, might be
critical for the development of  a MNS for facial
expressions.
Conclusions
Infants pay remarkable attention to their own actions,
with a strong preference for moving hands; generate
spontaneous motor activity with cyclic parameters that
might be in the optimal range for Hebbian learning; and
the synaptic activity in their parietal and frontal lobes
synchronizes in the theta-band during grasping. This
array of data, coming from a variety of empirical sources,
is consistent with our hypothesis that evolution optimized
infant behavioural patterns to produce canalized, reliable
Hebbian learning in the parietal-temporal-frontal system.
This set of behaviours and predispositions has probably
not been selected mainly for the adaptive value of having
a mirror system: congruent visuomotor mapping is
important for motor control, and the ‘symptoms’ of
experiential canalization we presented may have evolved
primarily to optimize Hebbian learning in the motor control
loop linking vision and action (Brass & Heyes, 2005;
Heyes, 2001; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006; Keysers &
Perrett, 2004). However, our hypothesis does not depend
on the specific selective process responsible for the
evolution of  these mechanisms, and is broadly com-
patible with a range of different phylogenetic scenarios.
This way of looking at the development of mirror neurons
has the benefit of bringing together a body of previously
unconnected aspects of infant motor and perceptual
development, and provides a plausible pathway for
mirror neurons to emerge from both active learning and
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innate predispositions. The model proposed here is
intended to have an essentially heuristic function: it is
far from exhaustive, and not intended to ‘prove’ the
absence of  other significant genetic or environmental
factors. Instead, we hope that it will stimulate researchers
to investigate the ontogeny of mirror neurons from a novel
perspective, suggest some new connections between the
neural and behavioural levels of infant development, and
thereby contribute to shedding light on the neural basis of
social cognition.
Appendix
Model description
Our mathematical model was built around the LTP
stabilization function empirically derived by Zhou et al.
(2003). These authors reported an approximately
quadratic relationship between inter-stimulus interval
t and LTP stabilization (hereby ΔLTP), reaching a
maximum for t = 5 min. The function
ΔLTP = max{0, (20t − 2t2)}
captures this empirical relationship, as shown in Figure
3(c). In the simulations, we proceeded as follows. p was
set at the beginning of the simulation; then, for each
combination of λ and ε over a grid of values, the total
LTP was set to zero and 50,000 ‘behavioural cycles’ were
run. At the beginning of each cycle, the inter-stimulus
interval ti was obtained:
ti = 1/(λ + εi) + ti−1,
where εi was randomly generated from a normal
distribution with mean zero and SD = ε, and ti−1 was the
interval’s previous value (starting from zero at the
beginning of the simulation). Then, the ‘motor pattern’
was performed with probability p. If  the pattern was
performed, ΔLTP was calculated from ti and added to
the total LTP, then ti was reset to zero. If  the pattern was
not performed, the next cycle began, thus increasing the
inter-stimulus interval to ti+1. After 50,000 cycles, the
average ΔLTP was calculated. What we obtained in this
way was the expected increase in LTP in a single cycle,
in the context of multiple cycles; we did not attempt to
model LTP saturation, as it is a virtually undescribed
phenomenon. However, saturation would not change the
model’s qualitative behaviour.
Effects of p and ε on the optimal value of λ
As described in the text, increasing p leads to a decrease
in optimal λ. The reason is that low p implies many
‘missed’ cycles, in which the motor pattern does not
occur, so that the actual inter-stimulus interval increases.
This effect does not depend on other assumptions in the
model. The effect of varying ε, on the other hand,
depends on the fact that the random distribution of
cycle durations
ti = 1/(λ + εi)
is modelled as being symmetric with respect to frequency.
If, for example, λ = .2 cycles/min and ε = .1 cycle/min,
there is an equal probability of (λ + εi) being lower than
.1 cycle/min (one SD below the mean) or higher than .3
cycles/min (one SD above the mean). However, the LTP
stabilization function is symmetric with respect to time;
once translated into cycle durations, the above frequency
values are no longer symmetric: .1 cycles/min → 10 min
and .3 cycles/min → 3.3 min, whereas the mean value is
.2 cycles/min → 5 min. Thus, ε affects LTP stabilization
asymmetrically, with increases in ε leading to increases
in optimal λ. How realistic is this effect? The CM literature
usually reports frequency peaks that are more or less
symmetric in shape (e.g. Figure 3a), so that the symmetry
assumption may be justified, and the effect realistic; to
the extent that such symmetry depends on smoothing
artifacts, this effect of ε may be artifactual too (note,
however, that to eliminate this effect of ε completely the
frequency peaks would need to be severely asymmetric).
We also tested the model’s dependence on the exact
shape of the LTP function; to this aim, we ran simulations
using either a fourth-degree polynomial or a triangular
function instead of the quadratic function described
above. This resulted in negligible changes in the model’s
output, confirming that our results hold quite independently
of the details of the stabilization function. Matlab™
source code of the simulations is available from the
authors.
Source of the empirical data in Figure 3c
A note on how we computed λ and ε from published
data (Figure 3c). We relied on reported statistics when
available, and approximated them from graphs when
they were not available in the text. Whereas the average
frequency λ was directly available in all of the studies,
irregularity was always described using WHM (width at
half-maximum) as a dispersion measure. Because ε in
our model is the distribution’s SD, we converted WHM
to SD assuming Gaussian-shaped frequency peaks.
The appropriate conversion formula is then ε = SD =
(WHM/2.36). We plotted data from all the studies on
human foetuses and infants we could find in the literature
(Robertson, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1993a, 1993b; Robertson
& Dierker, 1986, 2003; Robertson et al., 1982). In one of
the papers, CM parameters were measured before and
after an experimental manipulation; in this case, we
reported only the values before manipulation. In other
papers, foetuses of diabetic mothers were studied on
multiple occasions; in those cases, we reported only the
last measurements in time, at which foetuses of diabetic
mothers did not differ from those of healthy controls.
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